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Massachusetts AG requires debt buyer to discharge 300K in educational debt
On July 30, the Massachusetts attorney general announced a Nevada-based debt buyer will discharge nearly $300,000 in student loan debt in connection with a for-profit education company that sold allegedly ineffective online study guides and education materials. According to the assurance of discontinuance (AOD), the education company allegedly engaged in unfair and deceptive acts in the marketing and selling of its educational materials and services, which included arranging for consumers to finance equivalency exam fees. The company arranged for consumers to obtain financing from certain credit unions and those credit unions subsequently sold the loans to other entities, including the Nevada-based debt buyer.
The AOD requires the debt buyer to discharge and cease collection of the company’s loans for each of the 76 Massachusetts consumers, amounting to nearly $300,000 in debt. Additionally, the debt buyer is required to pay Massachusetts approximately $70,600 for the attorney general to distribute to consumers who made payments to the debt prior to the action, and is prevented from reporting any negative credit information.
7th Circuit: Separately reporting multiple debts is not a violation of the FDCPA
On July 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an FDCPA action claiming a collection agency (defendant) unfairly reported debts separately to a consumer reporting agency (CRA) instead of aggregating all of them into one debt. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs each defaulted on multiple medical services from their healthcare provider. The defendant eventually reported each debt separately to a consumer reporting agency. An amended complaint was filed alleging the defendant violated FDCPA Section 1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt because the debts were reported separately rather than aggregated together. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the argument was “unsupported by the FDCPA’s prohibition of ‘unfair or unconscionable’ means to collect a debt.” The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they owed a single debt to the healthcare providers.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit examined how the FDCPA defines a “debt,” and determined that its use in the statute is on a “per-transaction” basis”—which meant that the separate debts did not comprise a “single debt” under the FDCPA. The appellate court also determined that none of the eight examples of “unfair or unconscionable to collect or attempt to collect” a debt in the FDCPA addressed the “separate-versus-aggregate reporting of debts.” Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded, “It is reasonable, and not at all deceptive or outrageous, for a collector to report individually debts that correspond to different charges, thereby communicating truthfully how much is owed on each debt.” Moreover, the appellate court noted that “[s]ome consumers may prefer to have their debts reported in a way that conceals debt-specific information, like how much is owed on individual debts, when specific debts were incurred, and which debts are stale. Those consumers may be willing to forego the more detailed information on their credit reports if the aggregated reporting increases their credit scores. But a preference does not necessarily equal an injustice, partiality, or deception.”
Fannie Mae updates Lender Letter 2020-07 on Covid-19 payment deferrals
On July 15, Fannie Mae updated Lender Letter 2020-07. The additions (i) update requirements for repayment of escrow shortage amounts identified in connection with a Covid-19 payment deferral or as part of the next annual analysis, (ii) clarify how certain applicable fees (e.g., servicing, guaranty, and excess servicing fees) will be reimbursed for mortgage loans that receive a disaster payment deferral, and (iii) clarify that the servicer must evaluate the borrower for a Flex Modification in accordance with the reduced eligibility criteria when the borrower becomes 60 days delinquent within six months of the Covid-19 related payment deferral’s effective date and the servicer is unable to achieve quality right party contact.
Supreme Court keeps TCPA, severs government-debt exception as unconstitutional
On July 6, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc. that the TCPA’s government-debt exception is an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction and severed the provision from the remainder of the statute. As previously covered by InfoBytes, several political consultant groups (plaintiffs) argued that the TCPA’s statutory exemption enacted by Congress as a means of allowing automated calls to be placed to individuals’ cell phones “that relate to the collection of debts owed to or guaranteed by the federal government” is “facially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause” of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the debt-collection exemption to the automated call ban contravenes their free speech rights. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that “the free speech infirmity of the debt-collection exemption is not severable from the automated call ban and renders the entire ban unconstitutional.” The FCC, however, argued that the applicability of the exemption depended on the relationship between the government and the debtor and not on the content. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the FCC, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated, concluding the exemption violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court agreed with the 4th Circuit. The Court noted that “a law is content-based if ‘a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys’”; and a law that allows for robocalls asking for payment of government debt but does not allow robocalls for political donations, “is about as content-based as it gets.” The Court agreed with the government that the content-based restriction failed to satisfy strict scrutiny, as the government could not sufficiently justify the difference “between government-debt collection speech and other categories of robocall speech.” As for remedy, the Court applied “traditional severability principles,” with seven Justices concluding that the entire TCPA should not be invalidated but that the government-debt exception should be severed from the statute. The Court noted that its cases have “developed a strong presumption of severability,” and its “power and preference to partially invalidate a statute in that fashion has been firmly established since Marbury v. Madison.” Moreover, because the government-debt exception is “relatively narrow exception” to the TCPA’s broad robocall restriction, the Court concluded that severing the exception would “not raise any other constitutional problems.”
4th Circuit holds FDCPA’s limitation period restarts at each new violation
On July 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal of an action alleging violations of the FDCPA, concluding that each violation of the FDCPA is governed by its own limitation period. According to the opinion, in April 2018, homeowners filed a complaint against a law firm retained by their homeowners’ association for allegedly violating various provisions of the FDCPA for collection actions taken between April 2016 and February 2018. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the entire complaint was time-barred because the “FDCPA’s limitations period runs from the date of the first violation, and that later violations of the same type do not trigger a new limitations period under the Act.”
On appeal, the 4th Circuit disagreed with the lower court. Specifically, the appellate court noted that “nothing in the FDCPA suggests that ‘similar’ violations should be grouped together and treated as a single claim for purposes of the FDCPA’s statute of limitations.” And, similar to holdings of other circuits, the 4th Circuit stated that the “FDCPA’s limitations period runs anew from the date of each violation.” While the homeowners did not dispute that several alleged violations fall outside of the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period, the appellate court agreed that the district court erred in dismissing the entire complaint, because it contained at least two potential violations occurring within one-year of the April 2018 filing date.
Washington AG sues collection agency over time-barred debt settlement offers
On June 25, the Washington attorney general filed a complaint against a collection agency in King County Superior Court alleging the company’s settlement offers violated the state’s Collection Agency Act (CAA) and Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The complaint alleges that the company sent over 75,000 collection letters to Washington state residents and hundreds of thousands more letters to individuals in other states that told individuals they had a fixed number of days to respond to an offer to settle time-barred debts. However, according to the complaint, because the letters failed to disclose that the debts were legally unenforceable, they “had the capacity to deceive consumers into believing they could be sued on the debts if they did not pay.” These actions, the complaint claims, constitute an unfair and/or deceptive practice under the CPA. The company also allegedly violated the CAA, which, among other things, prohibits Washington-licensed collection agencies from threatening to take actions they cannot legally take. The complaint seeks injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and costs.
9th Circuit: Judicial foreclosure not debt collection under FDCPA
On June 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an FDCPA action, concluding that the FDCPA does not apply when a creditor is enforcing a security interest through a foreclosure, but is not seeking a deficiency judgment. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed an action against Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae’s loan servicer, the law firm that represented Fannie Mae in the foreclosure proceeding, and the firm’s attorneys (collectively, “defendants”) for, among other things, violating the FDCPA when seeking to foreclose on his residential property. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the FDCPA did not apply because the defendants had not engaged in any debt collection behavior by initiating the judicial foreclosure. In 2018, the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but subsequently ordered a supplemental briefing based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP (which held that law firms performing nonjudicial foreclosures are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, covered by InfoBytes here).
After the supplemental briefing, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the letter sent by the defendants when initiating the judicial foreclosure, which included monetary amounts owed, amounted to debt collection activity under the FDCPA. The appellate court noted that the defendants were merely fulfilling a procedural requirement (that has since been amended) of Oregon foreclosure law, and “in no event would a money award have been enforceable against [the plaintiff],” because of Oregon’s anti-deficiency judgment law. Thus, the appellate court concluded that a judicial foreclosure is not considered a debt collection activity when it does not “include a request for a deficiency judgment or some other effort to recover the remaining debt,” and therefore, the district court properly dismissed the action.
CFPB releases spring 2020 rulemaking agenda
On June 30, the CFPB released its spring 2020 rulemaking agenda. According to a Bureau announcement, the information details the regulatory matters that the Bureau “expect[s] to focus on” between May 1, 2020 and April 30, 2021. The announcement notes that the agenda was set before the Covid-19 pandemic struck and while the Bureau “continues to move forward with other regulatory work,” it will prioritize work related to supporting consumers and the financial sector during and after the Covid-19 pandemic.
In addition to the rulemaking activities already completed by the Bureau in May and June of this year, the agenda highlights other regulatory activities planned, including:
- Escrow Rulemaking. The Bureau intends to issue a proposed rule to implement Section 108 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, which directs the Bureau to exempt certain loans made by creditors with assets of $10 billion or less (and that meet other criteria) from the escrow requirements applicable to higher-priced mortgage loans.
- Small Business Rulemaking. The Bureau states that in September 2020, it will publicly release materials for an October panel (convening under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act) with small entities likely to be directly affected by the Bureau’s rule to implement Section 1071 of Dodd-Frank.
- HMDA. The Bureau states that two rulemakings are planned, including (i) a proposed rule that follows up on a May 2019 advanced notice of proposed rulemaking which sought information on the costs and benefits of reporting certain data points under HMDA and coverage of certain business or commercial purpose loans (covered by InfoBytes here); and (ii) a proposed rule addressing the public disclosure of HMDA data.
- Debt Collection. The Bureau intends to release the final rule amending Regulation F to implement the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in October 2020 (InfoBytes coverage of the May 2019 proposed rule here). Additionally, “at a later date” the Bureau intends to finalize the February supplemental proposal, which covers time-barred debt disclosures (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here).
- Qualified Mortgages (QM). The Bureau states it is considering issuing a proposed rule “later this year” that would create a new “seasoning” definition of a QM under Regulation Z, allowing for QM status after the borrower has made consistent timely payments for a defined period.
Additionally, in its announcement, the Bureau notes that it is (i) participating in an interagency rulemaking process on quality control standards for automated valuation models (AVMs) with regard to appraisals; and (ii) continuing to review and conduct the five-year lookback assessments under Section 1022(d) of Dodd-Frank.
Oregon enacts bill providing notarization relief
On June 30, the Oregon governor signed HB 4212, which provides relief relating to wage garnishment and notarization, among other things. The bill exempts certain recovery rebate payments under the CARES Act from garnishment requirements applicable to financial institutions. The bill also permits electronic notarization, provided certain requirements are met. The bill took effect on June 30.
Colorado enacts bill limiting certain debt collection activity
On June 29, the Colorado governor signed Bill 20-211, which places limitations on certain debt collections. Among other things, the bill prohibits a judgment creditor from initiating a new extraordinary collection action (i.e. a garnishment, attachment, levy or execution to collect or enforce a judgment on a debt) from the date of the bill through November 1, 2020, unless certain requirements set forth in the bill are met. These requirements include, but are not limited to, providing at least 10 days advance written notice to the debtor of their right to temporarily suspend the collection action if they are facing financial hardship due to the Covid-19 emergency.