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11th Circuit: Statements indicating accrual of debt balance following settlement are enough to state a claim
On July 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA case, holding that statements sent to plaintiffs indicating that a debt balance was accruing after a settlement had been reached is enough to state a claim. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs defaulted on a mortgage and a servicer sued for foreclosure. While the foreclosure suit was pending, the defendant took over servicing of the loan. A “disagreement” arose, which led the plaintiffs to sue the defendant. A settlement was reached and it was agreed that the plaintiffs owed $85,790.99, which was to be paid in one year. However, four months later, the defendant sent a mortgage statement notifying the plaintiffs that their loan had “been accelerated” because they were “late on [their] monthly payments.” On the defendant’s “fast-tracked timetable,” the plaintiff owed $92,789.55 to be paid in a month, and if they did not pay, the defendant’s statement stated that they risked more fees and “the loss of [their] home to a foreclosure sale.” The plaintiffs continued to receive statements and the amount due increased monthly. The plaintiffs sued, saying the defendant violated the FDCPA by sending statements with incorrect balances. A district court ruled the periodic statements were unrelated to debt collection because the defendant was required to send monthly updates under TILA. The district court further determined that the plaintiffs failed to state an FDCPA claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Florida law claims, and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit ruled that statements must comply with the FDCPA, even if they are not required to be sent under the statute. The 11th Circuit reiterated that the respective requirements of TILA and the FDCPA can be approached in a “harmonized” fashion, stating that “a periodic statement mandated by [TILA] can also be a debt-collection communication covered by the FDCPA.” The appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal because “the complaint here plausibly alleges that the periodic statements sent to the plaintiffs aimed to collect their debt.”
N.J. appeals court says debt collector may file suit during the pandemic
On June 29, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed a lower court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff debt collector in an action over whether a suit could be filed during the Covid-19 pandemic despite a clause in an agreement with the original creditor that barred collection actions in a disaster area. According to the opinion, the plaintiff purchased a portfolio of debts, including two credit card debts owned by the individual defendant. The plaintiff sued the defendant after attempts to collect on the debts were unsuccessful. The defendant filed a third-party complaint against the plaintiff asserting counterclaims accusing the plaintiff of violating the FDCPA, and stating that collection agencies were barred by an executive order that allegedly prohibited the initiation and adjudication of debt collection matters during the pandemic. A lower court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, after finding no genuine issue of material fact which would prevent summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Specifically, the lower court “found that plaintiff provided sufficient, credible evidence in the record that established the nexus between the accounts and defendant,” and “also found the executive order and FDCPA argument meritless,” as “no directive existed that prevented agencies from initiating debt collection matters during the COVID-19 pandemic.” The defendant appealed.
On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the lower court had “improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay documents” and erred in finding the executive order and FDCPA inapplicable. The defendant referred to a clause in an agreement she had with the original creditor, which said: “Without limiting the foregoing, [plaintiff] further represents and warrants that it shall: . . . (x) upon declaration by [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] or any appropriate local, state or federal agency that a location is a disaster area, [plaintiff] agrees to temporarily suspend its collection activities within said area until such time as is reasonable and practicable.” The appeals court agreed with the lower court’s reasoning, and called the defendant’s argument “baseless.” According to the appeals court, the defendant “failed to present evidence that an executive order prohibited the commencement and adjudication of debt collection matters during a state emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic” and failed to establish “that there is a contractual bar to plaintiff filing a debt collection suit in a disaster area.”
CFPB warns debt collectors on “pay-to-pay” fees
On June 29, the CFPB issued an advisory opinion to state its interpretation that Section 808 of the FDCPA and Regulation F generally prohibit debt collectors from charging consumers “pay-to-pay” fees for making payments online or by phone. “These types of fees are often illegal,” the Bureau said, explaining that its “advisory opinion and accompanying analysis seek to stop these violations of law and assist consumers who are seeking to hold debt collectors accountable for illegal practices.”
These fees, commonly known as convenience fees, are prohibited in many circumstances under the FDCPA, the Bureau said. It pointed out that allowable fees are those authorized in the original underlying agreements that consumers have with their creditors, such as with credit card companies, or those that are affirmatively permitted by law. Moreover, the Bureau stressed that the fact that a law does not expressly prohibit the assessment of a fee does not mean a debt collector is authorized to charge a fee. Specifically, the advisory opinion interprets FDCPA Section 808(1) to permit collection of fee only if: (i) “the agreement creating the debt expressly permits the charge and some law does not prohibit it”; or (ii) “some law expressly permits the charge, even if the agreement creating the debt is silent.” Additionally, the Bureau’s “interpretation of the phrase ‘permitted by law’ applies to any ‘amount’ covered under section 808(1), including pay-to-pay fees.” The Bureau further added that while some courts have adopted a “separate agreement” interpretation of the law to allow collectors to assess certain pay-to-pay fees, the agency “declines to do so.”
The Bureau also opined that a debt collector is in violation of the FDCPA if it uses a third-party payment processor for which any of that fee is remitted back to the collector in the form of a kickback or commission. “Federal law generally forbids debt collectors from imposing extra fees not authorized by the original loan,” CFPB Director Rohit Chopra said. “Today’s advisory opinion shows that these fees are often illegal, and provides a roadmap on the fees that a debt collector can lawfully collect.”
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau finalized its Advisory Opinions Policy in 2020. Under the policy, entities seeking to comply with existing regulatory requirements are permitted to request an advisory opinion in the form of an interpretive rule from the Bureau (published in the Federal Register for increased transparency) to address areas of uncertainty.
District Court grants summary judgment for debt collector over dunning emails
On June 23, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that dunning emails sent to collect unpaid credit card debt did not violate the FDCPA. The plaintiff received an email from the defendant stating that it was attempting to collect the debt on behalf of the creditor, and that due to the age of her debt, the creditor could not sue her for it. While the email stated that “making a payment on a time-barred debt has the potential to restart the statute of limitations for suit on the debt,” it went on to say that it was the creditor’s policy “never to file suit on a debt after the original statute of limitations has expired” and that it never sells such debt. A few days later, the defendant sent the plaintiff an email attempting to collect a separate debt owed to a different creditor. The plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter informing the defendant that she represented plaintiff and requested that plaintiff not be contacted again. After the plaintiff received a third email from the defendant, she sued alleging the defendant violated Section 1692e by urging her to pay a debt without disclosing that the defendant could not sue or report the debt. She further alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA by continuing to send communications even after the defendant knew she was represented by an attorney. The plaintiff argued that she suffered an injury—and had standing—because she refrained from making purchases and because the defendant had wasted her time.
The court disagreed, writing that the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence demonstrating some form of financial harm in order to have Article III standing. The court observed that “[o]ne does not suffer a monetary injury by refraining from making a purchase; one still has her money if she refrains from making a purchase. Paying too much for an item constitutes an economic injury but refraining from paying for an item does not. At best, plaintiff’s action might have left her with a feeling of want or desire, but such feelings are not concrete injuries.” Moreover, “[e]ven if plaintiff could be thought to have suffered an injury, her decision to refrain from any particular purchase is not fairly traceable to defendant,” the court wrote. And though the court found standing on her claim related to defendant’s continued contact, the court held that “Section 1692c(a)(2) applies only where the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to the specific debt being collected.” The defendant needed to be informed that the attorney was representing the plaintiff on both creditors’ debts for the third email to be a violation of the FDCPA, the court concluded.
District Court grants defendant’s judgment in FDCPA suit over dispute response
On June 21, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted a defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in an FDCPA case concerning dispute responses over a debt. According to the order, the defendants—who represented a bank—sent a letter to the plaintiff attempting to collect an unpaid credit card debt. The letter included information about the creditor, the outstanding balance, and a validation notice. The plaintiff disputed the debt and requested validation of charges, payments, and credits on the account. The defendants responded with another letter, providing information about the original creditor and the balance of the unpaid debt. The plaintiff then sent another letter to the defendants requesting the original account agreement, all original account level documentation, and a “wet ink signature of the contractual obligation.” The defendants filed a collection suit against the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit in response, alleging the collection lawsuit violated the FDCPA and North Carolina state law because it “unjustly” condemned and vilified plaintiff for his non-payment of the alleged debt.
The court found that the “[p]laintiff’s allegations misconstrue the obligations of the debt collector in verifying the debt.” The court also noted that the FDCPA did not require the defendants provide “account level documentation,” stating that “[v]erification only requires a showing that the amount demanded ‘is what the creditor is claiming is owed,’ not conclusive proof of the debt.”
6th Circuit reverses and remands judgment in debt collection suit
On June 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of a defendant-appellee law firm, holding that it did not first exhaust all of its efforts to collect from the actual debtor. According to the opinion, the plaintiff’s husband was convicted of embezzlement and willful failure to pay taxes and was sent invoices for his legal fees by another law firm, which he did not pay. The law firm hired the defendant to collect on the debt. The defendant filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff and her husband, arguing under the Ohio Necessaries Statute that the husband was liable to third parties for necessaries, such as food, shelter, and clothing that were provided to his wife. An Ohio state court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and an interlocutory appeal by the defendant was denied. The plaintiff then filed suit against the defendant, alleging that defendant’s underlying suit violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect under the claim that she was liable for her spouse’s debt. The district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion, which the plaintiff appealed.
On the appeal, the 6th Circuit found that the defendant did not follow the express commands of the Ohio Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, which held that spouses who are not debtors are liable only if the debtor does not have the assets to pay the debt themselves. The 6th Circuit found that the defendant did not satisfy those prerequisites to collect from the plaintiff when it filed a joint-liability suit against her and her husband. Thus, the collection efforts against the spouse who incurred the debt must be exhausted “before attempting to collect from a spouse.” The 6th Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
District Court issues judgment against student debt relief operation
On June 10, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a stipulated final judgment and order against an individual defendant who participated in a deceptive debt-relief operation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2019, the Bureau, along with the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general, and the Los Angeles City Attorney (together, the “states”), announced an action against the student loan debt relief operation for allegedly deceiving thousands of student-loan borrowers and charging more than $71 million in unlawful advance fees. In the third amended complaint, the Bureau and the states alleged that since at least 2015, the debt relief operation violated the CFPA, TSR, FDCPA, and various state laws by charging and collecting improper advance fees from student loan borrowers prior to providing assistance and receiving payments on the adjusted loans. In addition, the Bureau and the states claimed that the debt relief operation engaged in deceptive practices by, among other things, misrepresenting: (i) the purpose and application of fees they charged; (ii) their ability to obtain loan forgiveness for borrowers; and (iii) their ability to actually lower borrowers’ monthly payments. Moreover, the debt relief operation allegedly failed to inform borrowers that it was their practice to request that the loans be placed in forbearance and also submitted false information to student loan servicers to qualify borrowers for lower payments.
Under the terms of the final judgment, in addition to various forms of injunctive relief, the individual defendant must pay a $1 civil money penalty to the Bureau and $5,000 each to Minnesota, North Carolina, and California. The individual defendant is also “liable, jointly and severally, in the amount of $95,057,757, for the purpose of providing redress to Affected Consumers,” although his obligation to pay this amount is “suspended based on [his] inability to pay.”
Illinois amends Collection Agency Act provisions
On May 27, the Illinois governor signed HB 5220, which makes various amendments to provisions related to the state’s Collection Agency Act. Among other things, the amendments strike language repealing specified provisions and add, amend, and strike certain definitions, including amending “financial institution” to include “consumer installment lenders, payday lenders, sales finance agencies, and any other industry or business that offers services or products that are regulated under any Act administered by the [Director of the Division of Financial Institutions].” The amendments further provide that an adjudicated finding by the FTC or other federal or state agency that shows a licensee violated the FDCPA or its rules is grounds for disciplinary action. Also, at the discretion of the Secretary (after having first received the recommendation of the Collection Agency Licensing and Disciplinary Board), an “accused person’s license may be suspended or revoked, if the evidence constitutes sufficient grounds for such action.” Moreover, the amendments restore language providing that the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation may obtain written recommendations from the Collection Agency Licensing and Disciplinary Board “regarding standards of professional conduct, formal disciplinary actions, and the formulation of rules affecting these matters.” The Act takes effect January 1, 2023.
Judges disagree that “psychological states” can never support standing under FDCPA
On June 8, a majority of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied a plaintiff-appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc in a case concerning the collection of time-barred debt. In April, the 7th Circuit vacated a $350,000 jury award against a debt collector in an FDCPA action, holding that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing. The defendant sent the plaintiff a letter offering to resolve her defaulted credit card debt at a discount. The letter included a disclosure stating that “because of the age of the debt” it would not sue or report the debt to a credit agency and that payment or nonpayment would not affect her credit score. The plaintiff sued, claiming the letter “surprised and confused” her and was in violation of Sections 1692e(2), 1692e(10), and 1692f of the FDCPA. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff “reasoning that the misleading nature of the letter risked real harm to the interests that Congress sought to protect with the FDCPA.” A jury awarded the class $350,000 in damages. On appeal, the panel disagreed, explaining that the plaintiff never made a payment as a result of receiving the letter, nor did she “promise to do so or otherwise act to her detriment in response to anything in or omitted from the letter.” Calling the defendant to dispute the debt and contacting an attorney for legal advice “are not legally cognizable harms” and not enough to provide the “basis for a lawsuit,” the court wrote, adding that “[p]sychological states induced by a debt collector’s letter” are not enough to establish standing.
The majority of the 7th Circuit agreed with the panel’s ruling and voted not to hold an en banc rehearing. However, four judges dissented, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims “should easily satisfy” standing requirements established by the U.S. Supreme Court. “The emotional distress, confusion, and anxiety suffered by [plaintiff] in response to this zombie debt collection effort fit well within the harms that would be expected from many of the abusive practices,” the dissent said. “That’s true regardless of whether the debtor actually made a payment or took some other tangible action in response to them.” According to the dissent, the majority is “painting with too broad a brush” in finding that “[e]motional distress and other ‘psychological states’ can never support standing under the FDCPA.” This reasoning also overlooks close historical parallels in common and constitutional law that provide remedies for intangible injuries caused by many violations of the FDCPA and other consumer-protection statutes, the dissent added.
District Court preliminarily approves $2 million debt collection settlement over garnishment issuance fees
On May 24, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon preliminarily approved a class action settlement resolving claims concerning a debt collection agency’s $45 garnishment “issuance fee.” According to the plaintiffs, the defendant issued garnishments to debtors’ employers and banks through its in-house attorneys to collect revenue for outstanding debts. While Oregon law allows debt collectors to charge fees as a means of compensating for the expense of hiring attorneys who issue such garnishments, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant’s “$45 fee is an abuse of the cost recovery statute because using in-house attorneys relieves defendant from ever incurring such an expense.” The plaintiffs alleged violations of the FDCPA, Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act, and Oregon’s Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act. While the defendant denied any wrongdoing as part of the preliminarily approved settlement, it has agreed to pay $2 million to settle the claims. Class members, defined as more than 10,000 Oregonians allegedly injured by the $45 issuance fees between January 2018 and September 2019, will each receive “an amount three times greater than the actual damages caused originally by Defendant’s issuance fees.”