InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
District Court rules nonsignatory to credit card agreement cannot compel arbitration in debt collection case
On July 11, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied a law firm defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in an FDCPA case. According to the order, the plaintiff’s credit card, opened with a South Dakota-based bank, was stolen and charged more than $8,500. The plaintiff claimed that the original creditor did not investigate, refused to remove the charges, and attempted to collect on the debt. The creditor filed suit against the plaintiff to collect, and the plaintiff sought to move the case to arbitration. The creditor placed the account with the defendant, a debt collection law firm, whom the plaintiff then sued in federal court alleging unlawful collection attempts. The defendant sought to compel arbitration, based on the arbitration clause in the original agreement between the plaintiff and the creditor. The district court held that South Dakota law governed the card agreement, and a court ruling from that state’s Supreme Court held that nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement can compel arbitration only where (i) the plaintiff alleged “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct” between the signatory and nonsignatory; or (ii) the plaintiff’s claims against the nonsignatory arises out of the agreement. The district court stated that the plaintiff did not allege, nor could the district court infer, that the defendant worked “in concert” with the creditor to unlawfully collect the debt, but rather that it did not follow reasonable procedures under the FDCPA. Additionally, the district court held that the plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the nonsignatory defendant could not rely on the provision to compel arbitration.
District Court grants TRO and preliminary injunction in FDCPA case
On July 7, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against a defendant in an FDCPA case. In the motion, two individual plaintiffs claimed that the defendant called them 20 times in a three-day period and said he will continue calling “family, friends, and business interests until the [plaintiffs’] adult son’s debts are paid.” The plaintiffs’ attorney sent a notice to the defendant indicating that the plaintiffs were being represented and to not contact them directly. The defendant allegedly responded that he “does not intend to cease or desist.” After communicating with the plaintiffs’ attorney, the defendant allegedly called the plaintiffs’ business associates and employees over 40 times over a six-day period. The plaintiffs filed suit, claiming the defendant violated the FDCPA by, among other things, “using obscene language, and repeatedly and continuously calling Plaintiffs with the intent to abuse, annoy or harass,” and “threaten[ing] to sue them for debts that they do not owe.” According to the order, the defendant argued that the underlying debt is a business debt and thus not subject to the FDCPA. The district court found that the defendant “declined to present any evidence and refused the opportunity to testify under oath.” Ultimately, the district court stated that the plaintiffs “seek an injunction that only goes so far as to require Defendants’ compliance with the law.” Further, the district court noted that the defendant “will suffer no harm in that they are only being ordered to do that which is already legally required of them.”
CFPB sues payday lender over debt collection practices
On July 12, the CFPB filed a complaint against a Texas-based payday lender (defendant) for allegedly engaging in illegal debt-collection practices and allegedly generating $240 million in reborrowing fees from borrowers who were eligible for free repayment plans in violation of the CFPA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2014, the Bureau ordered the defendant to, among other things, pay $10 million for allegedly using false claims and threats to coerce delinquent payday loan borrowers into taking out an additional payday loan to cover their debt. The Bureau stated that after the CFPB’s 2014 enforcement action, the defendant “used different tactics to make consumers re-borrow.” The complaint alleges that the defendant “engaged in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices by concealing the option of a free repayment plan to consumers who indicated that they could not repay their short term, high-cost loans originated by the defendant.” The Bureau also alleges that the defendant attempted to collect payments by unfairly making unauthorized electronic withdrawals from over 3,000 consumers’ bank accounts. The Bureau seeks permanent injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement, damages, civil money penalties, and other relief.
11th Circuit: Statements indicating accrual of debt balance following settlement are enough to state a claim
On July 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA case, holding that statements sent to plaintiffs indicating that a debt balance was accruing after a settlement had been reached is enough to state a claim. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs defaulted on a mortgage and a servicer sued for foreclosure. While the foreclosure suit was pending, the defendant took over servicing of the loan. A “disagreement” arose, which led the plaintiffs to sue the defendant. A settlement was reached and it was agreed that the plaintiffs owed $85,790.99, which was to be paid in one year. However, four months later, the defendant sent a mortgage statement notifying the plaintiffs that their loan had “been accelerated” because they were “late on [their] monthly payments.” On the defendant’s “fast-tracked timetable,” the plaintiff owed $92,789.55 to be paid in a month, and if they did not pay, the defendant’s statement stated that they risked more fees and “the loss of [their] home to a foreclosure sale.” The plaintiffs continued to receive statements and the amount due increased monthly. The plaintiffs sued, saying the defendant violated the FDCPA by sending statements with incorrect balances. A district court ruled the periodic statements were unrelated to debt collection because the defendant was required to send monthly updates under TILA. The district court further determined that the plaintiffs failed to state an FDCPA claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Florida law claims, and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit ruled that statements must comply with the FDCPA, even if they are not required to be sent under the statute. The 11th Circuit reiterated that the respective requirements of TILA and the FDCPA can be approached in a “harmonized” fashion, stating that “a periodic statement mandated by [TILA] can also be a debt-collection communication covered by the FDCPA.” The appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal because “the complaint here plausibly alleges that the periodic statements sent to the plaintiffs aimed to collect their debt.”
N.J. appeals court says debt collector may file suit during the pandemic
On June 29, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed a lower court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff debt collector in an action over whether a suit could be filed during the Covid-19 pandemic despite a clause in an agreement with the original creditor that barred collection actions in a disaster area. According to the opinion, the plaintiff purchased a portfolio of debts, including two credit card debts owned by the individual defendant. The plaintiff sued the defendant after attempts to collect on the debts were unsuccessful. The defendant filed a third-party complaint against the plaintiff asserting counterclaims accusing the plaintiff of violating the FDCPA, and stating that collection agencies were barred by an executive order that allegedly prohibited the initiation and adjudication of debt collection matters during the pandemic. A lower court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, after finding no genuine issue of material fact which would prevent summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Specifically, the lower court “found that plaintiff provided sufficient, credible evidence in the record that established the nexus between the accounts and defendant,” and “also found the executive order and FDCPA argument meritless,” as “no directive existed that prevented agencies from initiating debt collection matters during the COVID-19 pandemic.” The defendant appealed.
On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the lower court had “improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay documents” and erred in finding the executive order and FDCPA inapplicable. The defendant referred to a clause in an agreement she had with the original creditor, which said: “Without limiting the foregoing, [plaintiff] further represents and warrants that it shall: . . . (x) upon declaration by [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] or any appropriate local, state or federal agency that a location is a disaster area, [plaintiff] agrees to temporarily suspend its collection activities within said area until such time as is reasonable and practicable.” The appeals court agreed with the lower court’s reasoning, and called the defendant’s argument “baseless.” According to the appeals court, the defendant “failed to present evidence that an executive order prohibited the commencement and adjudication of debt collection matters during a state emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic” and failed to establish “that there is a contractual bar to plaintiff filing a debt collection suit in a disaster area.”
CFPB warns debt collectors on “pay-to-pay” fees
On June 29, the CFPB issued an advisory opinion to state its interpretation that Section 808 of the FDCPA and Regulation F generally prohibit debt collectors from charging consumers “pay-to-pay” fees for making payments online or by phone. “These types of fees are often illegal,” the Bureau said, explaining that its “advisory opinion and accompanying analysis seek to stop these violations of law and assist consumers who are seeking to hold debt collectors accountable for illegal practices.”
These fees, commonly known as convenience fees, are prohibited in many circumstances under the FDCPA, the Bureau said. It pointed out that allowable fees are those authorized in the original underlying agreements that consumers have with their creditors, such as with credit card companies, or those that are affirmatively permitted by law. Moreover, the Bureau stressed that the fact that a law does not expressly prohibit the assessment of a fee does not mean a debt collector is authorized to charge a fee. Specifically, the advisory opinion interprets FDCPA Section 808(1) to permit collection of fee only if: (i) “the agreement creating the debt expressly permits the charge and some law does not prohibit it”; or (ii) “some law expressly permits the charge, even if the agreement creating the debt is silent.” Additionally, the Bureau’s “interpretation of the phrase ‘permitted by law’ applies to any ‘amount’ covered under section 808(1), including pay-to-pay fees.” The Bureau further added that while some courts have adopted a “separate agreement” interpretation of the law to allow collectors to assess certain pay-to-pay fees, the agency “declines to do so.”
The Bureau also opined that a debt collector is in violation of the FDCPA if it uses a third-party payment processor for which any of that fee is remitted back to the collector in the form of a kickback or commission. “Federal law generally forbids debt collectors from imposing extra fees not authorized by the original loan,” CFPB Director Rohit Chopra said. “Today’s advisory opinion shows that these fees are often illegal, and provides a roadmap on the fees that a debt collector can lawfully collect.”
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau finalized its Advisory Opinions Policy in 2020. Under the policy, entities seeking to comply with existing regulatory requirements are permitted to request an advisory opinion in the form of an interpretive rule from the Bureau (published in the Federal Register for increased transparency) to address areas of uncertainty.
District Court grants summary judgment for debt collector over dunning emails
On June 23, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that dunning emails sent to collect unpaid credit card debt did not violate the FDCPA. The plaintiff received an email from the defendant stating that it was attempting to collect the debt on behalf of the creditor, and that due to the age of her debt, the creditor could not sue her for it. While the email stated that “making a payment on a time-barred debt has the potential to restart the statute of limitations for suit on the debt,” it went on to say that it was the creditor’s policy “never to file suit on a debt after the original statute of limitations has expired” and that it never sells such debt. A few days later, the defendant sent the plaintiff an email attempting to collect a separate debt owed to a different creditor. The plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter informing the defendant that she represented plaintiff and requested that plaintiff not be contacted again. After the plaintiff received a third email from the defendant, she sued alleging the defendant violated Section 1692e by urging her to pay a debt without disclosing that the defendant could not sue or report the debt. She further alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA by continuing to send communications even after the defendant knew she was represented by an attorney. The plaintiff argued that she suffered an injury—and had standing—because she refrained from making purchases and because the defendant had wasted her time.
The court disagreed, writing that the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence demonstrating some form of financial harm in order to have Article III standing. The court observed that “[o]ne does not suffer a monetary injury by refraining from making a purchase; one still has her money if she refrains from making a purchase. Paying too much for an item constitutes an economic injury but refraining from paying for an item does not. At best, plaintiff’s action might have left her with a feeling of want or desire, but such feelings are not concrete injuries.” Moreover, “[e]ven if plaintiff could be thought to have suffered an injury, her decision to refrain from any particular purchase is not fairly traceable to defendant,” the court wrote. And though the court found standing on her claim related to defendant’s continued contact, the court held that “Section 1692c(a)(2) applies only where the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to the specific debt being collected.” The defendant needed to be informed that the attorney was representing the plaintiff on both creditors’ debts for the third email to be a violation of the FDCPA, the court concluded.
District Court grants defendant’s judgment in FDCPA suit over dispute response
On June 21, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted a defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in an FDCPA case concerning dispute responses over a debt. According to the order, the defendants—who represented a bank—sent a letter to the plaintiff attempting to collect an unpaid credit card debt. The letter included information about the creditor, the outstanding balance, and a validation notice. The plaintiff disputed the debt and requested validation of charges, payments, and credits on the account. The defendants responded with another letter, providing information about the original creditor and the balance of the unpaid debt. The plaintiff then sent another letter to the defendants requesting the original account agreement, all original account level documentation, and a “wet ink signature of the contractual obligation.” The defendants filed a collection suit against the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit in response, alleging the collection lawsuit violated the FDCPA and North Carolina state law because it “unjustly” condemned and vilified plaintiff for his non-payment of the alleged debt.
The court found that the “[p]laintiff’s allegations misconstrue the obligations of the debt collector in verifying the debt.” The court also noted that the FDCPA did not require the defendants provide “account level documentation,” stating that “[v]erification only requires a showing that the amount demanded ‘is what the creditor is claiming is owed,’ not conclusive proof of the debt.”
5th Circuit remands nonjudicial foreclosure suit back to state court
On June 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff borrower’s requested damages in a foreclosure lawsuit did not exceed the federal jurisdictional threshold amount of $75,000, and sent the case back to Texas state court. The plaintiff sued the financial institution in state court after it sought a nonjudicial foreclosure on his house, asserting violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act, breach of the common-law duty of cooperation, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The suit was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, with the defendant arguing that the suit automatically stayed its nonjudicial foreclosure sale, thus putting the value of the house ($427,662) as the amount in dispute, instead of the plaintiff’s requested relief of $74,500. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court on the premise “that the amount in controversy could not exceed the stipulated maximum of $74,500.” The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion, ruling that it “had to measure the amount in controversy ‘by the value of the object of the litigation,’” and not by what the plaintiff’s complaint says the damages were not to exceed.
In reversing and remanding the case to state court, the 5th Circuit concluded that, because the defendant did not show that the automatic stay brought the house’s value into controversy, it “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.” The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the house was simply collateral and “thus irrelevant to the amount in controversy,” writing that “[i]t is well-settled that neither the collateral effect of a suit nor the collateral effect of a judgment may count toward the amount in controversy.” The 5th Circuit also determined that the plaintiff expressly stipulated in both his original state-court petition and in a declaration “that he is seeking total damages not to exceed $74,500,” and that this stipulation is legally binding.
6th Circuit reverses and remands judgment in debt collection suit
On June 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of a defendant-appellee law firm, holding that it did not first exhaust all of its efforts to collect from the actual debtor. According to the opinion, the plaintiff’s husband was convicted of embezzlement and willful failure to pay taxes and was sent invoices for his legal fees by another law firm, which he did not pay. The law firm hired the defendant to collect on the debt. The defendant filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff and her husband, arguing under the Ohio Necessaries Statute that the husband was liable to third parties for necessaries, such as food, shelter, and clothing that were provided to his wife. An Ohio state court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and an interlocutory appeal by the defendant was denied. The plaintiff then filed suit against the defendant, alleging that defendant’s underlying suit violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect under the claim that she was liable for her spouse’s debt. The district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion, which the plaintiff appealed.
On the appeal, the 6th Circuit found that the defendant did not follow the express commands of the Ohio Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, which held that spouses who are not debtors are liable only if the debtor does not have the assets to pay the debt themselves. The 6th Circuit found that the defendant did not satisfy those prerequisites to collect from the plaintiff when it filed a joint-liability suit against her and her husband. Thus, the collection efforts against the spouse who incurred the debt must be exhausted “before attempting to collect from a spouse.” The 6th Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.